Numbers show Blue Jays' decision to pull Berrios was wrong move

There are a number of reasons that the Toronto Blue Jays dropped Game 2 of their wild-card series on Wednesday to bring their 2023 season to an end.

Not producing a single extra-base hit was a major impediment to victory, having a runner picked off in a crucial spot hurt, and missing out on a bases-loaded double by the narrowest possible margin was a devastating blow to the team’s chances.

Above all, the decision to lift José Berríos for Yusei Kikuchi in the fourth inning will be remembered as the cause of the Blue Jays’ downfall.

To some extent that’s unfair. A better offensive performance could’ve bailed the Blue Jays out of a move gone wrong early in the game — and we’ll never know for sure how Berríos would’ve performed in a longer outing. 

With those qualifiers out of the way, the early hook for Berríos was clearly a poor decision. It’s easy to say that because of the result alone, but there are also plenty of fundamentally sound strategic moves that simply don’t work. There are also suspect moves that blow up in a team’s face when everybody’s watching.

Going to Kikuchi fits in the latter category.

It’s not impossible to envision a world where bringing in the southpaw could have gone well.

When Kikuchi entered the game three of the next four hitters were Max Kepler, Alex Kirilloff, and Matt Wallmer. Kepler has been slightly better against right-handed pitchers than southpaws in 2023, and both Kirilloff and Walmer had wRC+ marks of 37 or less vs. lefties.

The way the Blue Jays saw it, Minnesota would either have to lift multiple dangerous left-handed bats from the game early, or suffer a miserable fourth inning at a significant matchup disadvantage.

While that sounds like a situation that backed the Twins into a corner, what it really did was provide them with an instant offensive opportunity if they were willing to sacrifice a little late-inning flexibility.

The first three hitters Kikuchi faced when he came in had the following numbers against left-handers in 2023:

• RF Kepler (.250/.320/.432 — 108 wRC+)

• PH Dominic Solano (.286/.346/.400 — 100 wRC+)

• SS Carlos Correa (.248/.346/.436 — 115 wRC+)

Those aren’t world-beating statistics, but they were clearly advantageous for the Twins and they only had to lose one hitter — Kirilloff — to make things tough for Kikuchi. Correa’s true talent also outstrips that line, and it’s worth remembering Kikuchi was far worse against right-handed bats (.756 OPS against) than left-handed bats this year (.659 OPS).

When it came time for Minnesota to pinch hit for Wallmer — and bring out its fourth hitter to face the Blue Jays lefty — they arguably let Toronto off the hook, going with switch-hitting utility man Willi Castro (82 wRC+ vs. LHP) instead of infielder Kyle Farmer (117 wRC+). Castro hit into a double play that scored one, but helped diffuse the situation.

As a result of this move, the Twins were in a weaker position to hunt favourable matchups late in the game, but they’d already been gifted the kind of promising setup against Kikuchi they were unlikely to find later, anyway.

The Blue Jays thought they were giving Minnesota a difficult choice, but the Twins decided the bird in the hand was worth two in the bush — and it paid off for them.

All of that is to say that the Kikuchi gambit was a dubious premise to begin with. It became more difficult to defend in the context of how Berríos was pitching.

The 29-year-old was absolutely carving his former team up through three-plus innings, and while it can be easy to overrate the predictive value of how a pitcher is looking in any given moment — Berríos had a lot going for him.

Through 47 pitches the velocity on all four of his offerings was at least 1 mph above his season averages. His command also looked crisp as the right-hander was hugging the corners and leaving very little in the middle of the dish:

Not only did his stuff look sharp and well-located, the Twins generally weren’t getting near it. Minnesota had three hits, but they were all singles, and the team’s average exit velocity was 79.7 mph. 

The Twins’ swing decisions were also out of whack as they swung for 47 percent of the pitches they saw outside the strike zone. The sample size on all of this stuff is tiny, but every indication available suggested he was cruising.

Berríos also had history on his side. Coming into the game current Twins hitters had a .161 batting average against him while slugging .242 in 77 trips to the plate. Those numbers were backed by .149 xBA and .247 xSLG. Small sample size again, but everything pointed to the notion that Berríos had this team under wraps, at least for the time being.

The Blue Jays starter allowed hitters to slash a juicy .303/.369/.476 against him the third time through the order in the regular season. If Toronto had lifted him after he got through the order twice — even if he was still dealing — the conversation would be entirely different.

Instead, the team treated the situation as if there wasn’t a cost associated with losing Berríos early despite the evidence that he had more to give. They also valued the idea of forcing Twins bats out of the game more than they feared Kikuchi facing a particularly tough situation — when there was already a runner on first and no outs.

Facing an elimination game the Blue Jays trusted a fourth starter with notable platoon splits to navigate a critical situation at a matchup disadvantage. 

If they thought that scenario wouldn’t arise because the Twins would punt the fourth inning to preserve Kirilloff and Wallner, they badly miscalculated. If they saw things playing out the way they did, that means they were overconfident in Kikuchi and didn’t take what Berríos was doing into account. 

Either way, it’s a tough move to defend.

Prior to the game the Berríos-Kikuchi piggyback might have seemed like an appealing idea, but once they reached the point to execute that plan there were new variables. A man was on base, increasing the likelihood the Twins would empty their bench for a battle with Kikuchi, and Berríos was stronger than they had reason to expect.

Neither of those things dissuaded Toronto from making its move. That was costly in the moment, and it's unlikely to be remembered kindly by history.